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Abstract. In this paper, we focus on attacks and defense mechanisms in
additive reputation systems. We start by surveying the most important
protocols that aim to provide privacy between individual voters. Then,
we categorize attacks against additive reputation systems considering
both malicious querying nodes and malicious reporting nodes that col-
laborate in order to undermine the vote privacy of the remaining users.
To the best of our knowledge this is the first work that provides a de-
scription of such malicious behavior against such systems. In light of this
analysis we demonstrate the inefficiencies of existing protocols.
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1 Introduction
During the last few years, online communities have experienced a significant
amount of growth. Among the main factors contributing to their increased pop-
ularity is user-friendliness and ease of understanding but also accessibility and
availability of information and services. These characteristics make it easy, even
for novice users, to exchange information with strangers in way that guarantees
a certain degree of anonymity. However, these features can be abused by mali-
cious users who can either impersonate other entities and launch various types
of attacks under fake identities or provide negative feedback for well behaving
users, irrespective of the service they have received.
Reputation systems have been proposed as the means to protect online com-
munities from such malicious behavior. The main goal of a reputation system is
to reduce the risk involved in interactions between strangers by collecting, dis-
tributing and aggregating feedback about participants’ past behavior in order to
predict possible future behavior and identify dishonest community members [5].
However, one concern about reputation systems, which has received relatively
little attention in the literature, is that of feedback providers’ privacy. Although
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there are many reputation and trust establishment schemes, only some of them
deal with the problem of securing the votes or ratings of participating nodes. This
lack of privacy can lead to several problems including the proper functioning of
the network. For example, it has been observed in [4] that users of a reputation
system may avoid providing honest feedback in fear of retaliation, if reputation
scores cannot be computed in a privacy-preserving manner. Additionally, the
absence of schemes that provide (partial) privacy in decentralized environments,
such as ad hoc networks, is even larger.
Hence the development of reputation protocols that can be used to provide
anonymous feedback is essential to the survivability of online communities and
electronic marketplaces. In some sense, provision of anonymous feedback to a
reputation system is analogous to that of anonymous voting in electronic elec-
tions. It potentially encourages truthfulness by guaranteeing secrecy and freedom
from explicit or implicit influence. Although this freedom might be exploited by
dishonest feedback providers, who tend to report exaggerated feedbacks, it seems
highly beneficial for honest users, protecting the latter from being influenced by
malicious behavior [5].
In this invited paper we present a theoretical analysis of the vulnerabilities
of existing decentralized additive reputation systems, regarding the privacy of
individual votes. A decentralized system is one in which there is no central
repository to collect and report reputation scores. In such a system, the users
themselves are responsible for maintaining a local repository of trust ratings and
providing feedback when queried by other users. To the best of our knowledge
this is the first work that provides a description of malicious behavior/attacks
against such systems. We use this categorization to demonstrate the inefficiencies
of existing protocols in the hope to spawn further research in the area.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we define the problem of
secure trust aggregation and we define the basic terms that we use in the rest of
the paper. In Sections 3, 4 and 5 we present the details of the most important
protocols that allow ratings to be (partially) private in decentralized additive
reputation systems. In Section 6, we present attacks that can break the privacy
of the presented protocols and in Section 7 we conclude the paper.
2 Problem Statement & Definitions
Definition 1: A Reputation System R is said to be a Decentralized Additive
Reputation System if it satisfies the following two requirements:
1. Feedback collection, combination and propagation are implemented in a de-
centralized way.
2. Combination of feedbacks provided by nodes is calculated in an additive man-
ner.
In trust management and reputation schemes nodes in a network have in
general two ways of collecting information about other nodes. They use either
first-hand information (Direct Trust) or second-hand information (Third-Party
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Trust) in order to evaluate other nodes. A trust establishment framework evalu-
ates neighboring nodes based on direct observations while trust relations between
two nodes with no prior direct interactions are built through a combination of
opinions from intermediate nodes. In this work we are concerned with the fol-
lowing problem:
Problem Statement: A querying node Aq, receives a request from a target
node At. Since Aq has incomplete information about At, she asks other nodes
in the network to give their votes about At. Let U = {U1, · · · , Un} be a set
with all nodes that Aq asks to vote. The problem is to find a way that each
vote (vi) remains private while at the same time Aq would be in position of
understanding what voters, as a whole, believe about At, by evaluating a sum of
all votes (
∑n
i=1 vi).
All the protocols that are presented in this paper assume that the adversary
is semi-honest (for a definition see Section 6). For the following sections, we
assume that each node (Aq, Ui, i ∈ [1, n]) has generated a public/private key
pair (kAq/KAq , kUi/KUi). The private key is kept secret, while the public key is
shared with the rest of the nodes. The vote of Ui concerning At is denoted by
vi.
3 Pavlov et al. Schemes [5]
Pavlov et al. [5] showed that there are limits on supporting perfect privacy in
decentralized reputation systems. More precisely, they showed that when n− 1
dishonest peers collude with the querying node to reveal the reputation rating
of the remaining honest node then perfect privacy is not feasible. In addition,
they suggested a probabilistic scheme for peers selection to ensure that such
a scenario will occur with small probability and they proposed three protocols
that allow ratings to be privately provided in decentralized additive reputation
systems.
3.1 Protocol 1 (Figure 1(a))
During the initialization step, Aq creates the set U with all voters, orders them
in a circle: Aq → U1 → · · · → Un and sends to each Ui the identity of his
successor in the circle. Next, Aq generates a random number rq such that rq 6= 0
and sends it to the first node in the circle, U1. Upon reception, U1 adds his vote
v1 and sends to his successor the sum rq + v1. Each remaining node in the list
follows the same procedure. Finally, the last node will send back to Aq the sum
rq +
∑n
i=0 vi. Upon reception, Aq will subtract rq and will divide the remaining
number by n. The result will be the average of all votes in the set U .
3.2 Protocol 2 (Figure 1(b))
During the initialization step, Aq creates the set U , sends to each Ui, i ∈ [1, n]
the whole list U and generates a random number rq such that rq 6= 0. Each of
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(a) First Protocol (b) Second Protocol
Fig. 1. Pavlov et al. protocols
the n+ 1 nodes (including Aq) split their votes (Aq splits rq = rq,1 + · · ·+ rq,n)
into n+1 shares in the following way: Ui chooses n random numbers ri,1, · · · , ri,n
such that vi = ri,1 + · · · + ri,n and calculates ri = rq,i −
∑n
k=1 ri,k. He keeps
ri and sends ri,1, · · · , ri,n to the n other nodes, such that each node Uj receives
ri,j . At the next step, each Uj calculates valj =
∑n
i=1(ri,j) + rj and sends valj
to Aq. Upon reception, Aq calculates the sum of n votes
∑n
i=1(vali)−rq, divides
by n and finds the average of votes.
3.3 Protocol 3
The goal of this protocol is to ensure that reputation ratings lie within a pre-
defined range. It uses Pederson’s [1] verifiable secret sharing scheme to support
validity checking of the feedback values provided by voters.
The authors assume that the values of votes vi are integers in the Gq group
of prime order q. In the initialization step, Aq selects a group Gq of a large
prime order q with generators g and h, where loggh is hard to find. Then
she sends to each Ui the list U of all nodes along with g and h. Each Ui
creates two polynomials of degree n: pi(x) = pi0 + p
i
1x + p
i
0x
2 + · · · + pi0x
n
such that vi = p
i
0 and q
i(x) = qi0 + q
i
1x + q
i
0x
2 + · · · + qi0x
n where all
coefficients, except pi0 are chosen uniformly at random from Gq. Ui sends
to each node Uj , j ∈ [1, i) ∪ (i, n + 1] (Un+1 node is considered as Aq)
pi(j) and qi(j) along with the commitments of his polynomials of the form:
gp
i
0hq
i
0 , · · · , gp
i
nhq
i
n . Each Uj upon reception of p
1(j), p2(j), · · · , pj−1(j), pj+1(j),
· · · , pn(j) and q1(j), q2(j), · · · , qj−1(j), qj+1(j), · · · , qn(j), calculates pj(j), qj(j),
sm =
∑n
i=1 p
i(j) and tm =
∑n
i=1 q
i(j) and sends sm and tm to Aq which calcu-
lates sn+1 =
∑n
i=1 p
i(n+ 1) and tn+1 =
∑n
i=1 q
i(n+ 1).
Upon reception of s1, · · · , sn and t1, · · · , tn, Aq obtains s(0), where s(x) =∑n
i=1 p
i(x) in the following manner: it computes
∑n+1
i=1 siLi(0), where Li(0) is
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the Lagrange polynomial at 0 and in this case could be expressed by Li(0) =∏n+1
j=1,j 6=i
j
j − i .
4 k-Shares Protocol [7]
Hasan et al. [7] proposed a privacy preserving reputation protocol under the
semi-honest model. The authors were inspired from the second Pavlov protocol
and their goal was to reduce the message complexity to O(n). It’s main difference
from the protocol of Section 3.2 is that each user Ui sends its shares to at most
k < n − 1 “trustworthy” agents whose behavior in the context of preserving
privacy can be “assured” by Ui.
During initialization, Aq sends to each Ui the whole list U . Each Ui selects
up to k nodes from U in such a way that the probability that all the selected
nodes will collude to break Ui’s privacy, is low. Let Ai = {Um, · · · , Um+k} be the
k nodes that were selected by Ui. At this point, Ui prepares k+1 shares as follows:
The first k shares are random numbers (ri,1, · · · , ri,n) uniformly distributed over
a large interval while the last one is selected such that: vi =
∑n+1
j=1 ri,j . Ui sends
to Aq the set Ai and sends ri,j to each Uj , j ∈ [m,m + k]. At this point Aq
has also received the Ai sets and can, thus, calculate the list of nodes that each
Ui should expect to receive shares from. Aq sends this list to each Ui which in
turns proceeds to receive shares from the nodes of the list that Aq provided with.
Ui computes the sum of all shares that were received as well as his own share
ri,k+1. The last step for each voter is to send back to Aq the previous calculated
sum σi. Aq calculates the sum
∑n
i=1 σi and divides it by n in order to find the
average of all the votes.
5 Dolev et al. Protocols
Dolev et al. [8] proposed four decentralized schemes where the number of mes-
sages exchanged is proportional to the number of participants. The first two
protocols (AP and WAP protocol) assume that Aq is not compromised while
the next two protocols, namely MPKP and MPWP assume that any node that
participates in the protocol can act maliciously.
Apart from that, all the proposed schemes are based heavily on a secure
homomorphic cryptosystem. More precisely, the AP and WAP protocols are
based on the Paillier cryptosystem [3], while MPKP and MPWP are based on
the Benaloh cryptosystem [2].
5.1 Multiple Private Keys Protocol (MPKP)
During initialization, Aq creates two (1 × n) vectors. The trust vector TV =
[1 . . . 1] and the accumulated vector AV = [1 . . . 1]. In addition, she creates an
accumulated variable σ with initial value equal to 1.
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Fig. 2. Basic Steps of MPWP Protocol
MPKP is divided into two rounds. During the first round each Ui splits
his vote vi in n-shares (ri,1, · · · , ri,n). More precisely, Ui selects his n-shares at
random such that vi =
∑n
j=1 ri,j , encrypts each ri,j with the public key kj of
user Uj and multiplies it with AV [j]. At the end of the first round we will have
that AV =
[∏n
k=1 {r1,k}k1 · · ·
∏n
k=1 {rn,k}kn
]
.
At this point, the second round begins. Each Ui decrypts AV [i] with his
private key KUi , finds
∑n
j=1 rj,i, encrypts it with the public key kAq of Aq and
adds the encrypted value to σ. Furthermore, he deletes the i-th entry and sends
the updated TV vector to the next node in U . At the last step, Aq will receive∏n
i=1E(
∑n
j=1 ri,j) which decrypts it, divides it by n and finds the average of
the votes.
5.2 Multiple Private Keys Weighted Protocol (MPWP - Figure 2)
This is the weighted version of MPKP protocol where the weights wi correspond
to the trust level that Aq has assigned to each Ui, respectively. MPWP computes
the weighted average of votes that are given by each individual Ui.
At the initialization stage,Aq creates a (1×n) vector TV = [E(w1) . . . E(wn)],
where wi, i ∈ [1, n] is the trust level of Ui. Additionally, Aq initializes a (n× n)
matrix of shares T , where
T =


1 1 . . . 1
...
...
. . .
...
1 1 . . . 1


and sets the accumulated value σ = 1. Aq sends to each Ui the TV vector and the
matrix T . Upon reception, each Ui generates a random number ri and calculates
E(wi)
viri. Then he adds it to σ by calculating σ = σ ·E(wi)
viri and deletes the
corresponding entry from TV . At this point, Ui shares his random number ri by
replacing the i-th row of T with Si =
[
{ri,1}k1 . . . {ri,n}kn
]
. At the end of the
first round, Aq receives the updated TV entry that is equal to
∏n
i=1E(wi)
viri
and the updated shares matrix T , where
Vulnerabilities of Existing Decentralized Reputation Systems 7
T =


{r1,1}k1 {r1,2}k2 . . . {r1,n}kn
...
...
. . .
...
{rn,1}k1 {rn,2}k2 . . . {rn,n}kn

 .
Aq, by decrypting TV will obtain
∑n
i=1 wivi + ri.
So, at this point Aq knows the sum of all weighted votes along with the
random numbers. This means that she needs to subtract
∑n
i=1 ri in order to
calculate the average votes. In order to do so, a second round of the protocol be-
gins where each Ui receives T , decrypts T [][i] with KUi and calculates
∑n
j=1 rj,i.
Then he encrypts it with kAq , adds it to σ and deletes the i-th column from
T . After that, Aq will receive σ =
∏n
i=1E(
∑n
j=1 rj,i), which decrypts with KAq
and finds the sum of all random numbers. Finally, she subtracts the result from
TV and finds the weighted average of the votes.
6 Threat Model and Attacks
In this section we describe and categorize the various types of attacks that aim
to break the privacy of the above mentioned schemes. All the protocols that are
presented in this paper assume that the adversary is semi-honest. A definition
for the semi-honest model follows:
Semi-Honest Model: In the semi-honest adversarial model, even malicious
nodes correctly follow the protocol specification. However, malicious nodes over-
hear all messages and attempt to use them in order to learn information that
otherwise should remain private. Semi-honest adversaries are also called honest-
but-curious.
In all the cases, we assume that Aq is malicious and can overhear every
message that is exchanged between voters. If we do not make this assumption,
the problem of trust aggregation has a trivial solution.
Fig. 3. Querying Node Attack
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1. Querying Node Attack (Figure 3): In this attack, the only malicious
node is Aq, which can overhear all messages that are sent between voters.
Affected Protocols: Pavlov Protocols 1, 2 and 3, k-shares protocol, Dolev
protocols AP and WAP.
– Querying Node Attack at Pavlov Protocol 1: Aq has generated a
random number rq at the beginning of the protocol and voters are adding
their votes to that number one by one. This means that Aq can find each
individual vote by overhearing every message, since she knows rq.
– Querying Node Attack at Pavlov Protocols 2, 3 & k-Shares Pro-
tocol: The random numbers that each node generates do not really offer
any protection from Aq or from any other curious adversary who over-
hears the channel. This is because the parts of the random numbers that
are exchanged among the nodes are not encrypted in any way.
– Querying Node Attack at AP & WP: Since all messages are en-
crypted with kAq and the voters do not use random numbers, Aq can still
decrypt each message one by one in order to find the individual votes for
every Ui, i ∈ [1, n].
Fig. 4. Alone in the List Attack
2. Alone in the List Attack (Figure 4): If Aq is malicious she can ask each
node from U to give their vote separately. By doing so, she will be able to
find the value of all individual votes and thus easily break their privacy.
Affected Protocols: All protocols
– Analysis: Normally, Aq receives a sum of votes and that is the reason
why she cannot understand the exact vote of each Ui. In the case where
Aq asks each Ui to vote individually (size of U is equal to 1), she receives
one vote at a time. Thus she knows the vote of each voter.
3. Sandwich Attack (Figure 5): In this scenario, Aq is considered as mali-
cious and arranges the nodes in U in such a way that all U2k+1 or U2k, k ∈ N
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Fig. 5. Sandwich Attack
nodes are malicious. By doing so, Aq can use values from adjacent malicious
nodes to calculate the random number of the legitimate node situated be-
tween them, thus finding all the individual votes in the set. This attack is
effective on protocols where each node is sending either a random number
that she has generated either a share of her vote to the next node in U .
Affected Protocols: Pavlov Protocols 1 2 and 3, k-Shares protocol, AP,
WAP.
– Sandwich Attack at Pavlov Protocol 1: Even if Aq could not overhear
all messages, he could cooperate with every malicious voter in order to
find the votes of the rest nodes. More precisely, each malicious user would
inform Aq about his vote as well as the sum that he received from the
previous node. Upon reception,Aq would subtract the vote of the malicious
node and the random number rq that he generated at the initialization
step. The result would be the vote of the previous node.
– Sandwich Attack at Pavlov Protocols 2,3, k-Shares protocol: As
we mentioned before, the random numbers are not encrypted with any
key which means that the whole information is known to everyone who
overhears the channel. The cooperation between malicious voters and Aq
is not essential, since Aq can find the votes on his own.
– Sandwich Attack at AP & WP: In both cases, the sum of votes is
encrypted with the public key of Aq and each Ui adds his vote to the
previous one, by using the homomorphic property of the underlying cryp-
tosystem. Even though votes are encrypted this time, the encryption does
not offer any kind of protection if Aq is adversarial. Also in this case, the
cooperation between malicious voters and Aq is not essential, since Aq can
find the votes on her own.
– MPKP &MPWP Resistance to Sandwich Attack:We assume that
Aq and U2k+1, k ∈ N are malicious (U1, U3, U5, etc). After the first round,
malicious nodes will be aware of v2k+1, r2k+1,i, r2k,2k+1, k ∈ N, i ∈ [1, n]
values. At the end of the second round, Aq will be aware of the following:
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a)
∑n
i=1 vi. Since she also knows each v2k+1 she can easily calculate∑n/2
i=1 v2i.
b)
∑n
i=1 ri,1, · · · ,
∑n
i=1 ri,n. Since every node adds
∑n
j=1 rj,i to E(.), Aq
can find each individual sum.
Table 1 shows a list of what Aq knows at the end of the protocol and what
information she is missing. By using these values, Aq cannot find the in-
dividual votes from the legitimate voters. The only thing she can do is to
approximately calculate the values since she knows that each vote vi is
bounded from α and β. This is a legitimate assumption since Dolev et al.
made the additional requirement that the homomorphic modulus, m must
be identical for all users. This is possible under the Benaloh cryptosystem
[2], however, decryption can only be performed by trying all possible val-
ues and finding the unique value that decrypts correctly. Furthermore, a
(degenerate version of a) sandwich attack can be successfully lunched only
in the case where n − 1 nodes are compromised (as Dolev et al. mention
in their paper).
Table 1. Information that Aq has gained at the end of the second round
v1 r1,1 r1,2 r1,3 r1,4 · · · r1,n
r2,1 r2,3 · · · r2,n
v3 r3,1 r3,2 r3,3 r3,4 · · · r3,n
r4,1 r4,3 · · · r4,n
...
...
...
...
... · · ·
...
vn rn,1 rn,2 rn,3 rn,4 · · · rn,n
The weaknesses of the described protocols are summarized in Table 2.
7 Conclusions
In this invited paper, we have presented a series of protocols aiming to provide
privacy between individual voters in an additive reputation system. We have
analyzed these protocols in order to see how they react when honest-but-curious
nodes try to break the privacy and find the individual votes of other nodes. To
this end, we have provided a description of malicious behaviors/attacks against
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Table 2. Protocols Summary – Resistance to Attacks
Querying Alone in the List Sandwich
Pavlov 1 NO NO NO
Pavlov 2 NO NO NO
Pavlov 3 NO NO NO
k Shares NO NO NO
AP NO NO NO
WAP NO NO NO
MPKP YES NO YES
MPWP YES NO YES
these protocols by utilizing three different attack scenarios. Additionally, we
showed that none of the existing protocols can build defensive mechanisms that
provide resistance against all possible attacks. More precisely, all protocols are
vulnerable to an “alone in the list” attack which may be the most difficult attack
to handle.
We are currently working on the design of a decentralized privacy preserving
scheme based on homomorphic encryption that will provide effective defense
mechanisms against the type of attacks described above.
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